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THE END OF ARBITRATION AS WE KNOW IT?  ARBITRATION UNDER ATTACK 
By 




During the past few years arbitration has been under attack. Recent judicial 
decisions, newly enacted and proposed legislation, and populist sentiments are 
important and obviously can result in significant changes. But many of the 
criticisms leveled at arbitration can be addressed and, most significantly, there are 
practical and inescapable realities that will ensure arbitration’s survival.   
 Arbitration’s viability as a popular and effective dispute resolution process 
will continue as a result of powerful economic, cultural, and social developments. 
The increasing and worrisome inability of state governments to adequately fund 
the judiciary, combined with the fact that, as a society, we continue to integrate 
technology into every aspect of our lives, guarantees that arbitration will remain 
the dispute resolution process of choice in many circumstances. But we must keep 
in mind that as we move forward, practices and procedures that we take for granted 
today may no longer be available.  
This article will explain how state governments’ budget challenges and 
society’s increasing migration to technology will strengthen arbitration’s status as 
a convenient and effective dispute resolution process. The article will identify and 
discuss the most noteworthy attacks on arbitration and explain why these attacks 
will not be fatal. Finally, recent United States Supreme Court cases Rent-A-Center, 
West, Inc. v. Jackson1 and Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.,2 
                                                 
*Professor of Law, Senior Fellow and former Director, Dispute Resolution Institute, 
Hamline University School of Law.  Professor Larson was the founder and Editor-In-Chief 
of the Journal of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment, a Hearing Examiner for 
the Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission, an arbitrator for the Omaha Tribe, and 
currently serves as an independent arbitrator. Professor Larson is Chairperson for the 
American Bar Association Law School Division Arbitration Competition. He was a 
member of the American Bar Association’s E-commerce and ADR Task Force and a U.S. 
West Technology Fellow. He is a Qualified Neutral under Minnesota Supreme Court Rule 
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and pending United States Supreme Court case AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,3 
will be summarized and the impact of those cases on the future of arbitration will 
be discussed. 
 
II. STATE GOVERNMENTS CANNOT ADEQUATELY FUND THE JUDICIARY 
 
 State governments around the county are experiencing unprecedented 
budget deficits and the situation may get worse before it gets better.  In states 
where the median age of the population is rising, the situation in the author’s state 
of Minnesota for example, an increasing number of residents will pay income tax 
at a lower rate when they retire than they are paying today and state revenues will 
decline as a result.4 
 California far and away is the state leader in terms of the largest dollar 
deficit with a stunning predicted budget deficit of $24.5 billion.5 Other states with 
smaller overall budgets are similarly challenged. Illinois has a predicted $15 billion 
deficit6 and Pennsylvania, our location for this well-planned and timely 
symposium, has a predicted deficit of $4 billion.7 Minnesota originally had a 
                                                                                                                            
114, his recent articles are available at http://ssrn.com/author=709717, and he can be 
contacted at dlarson@hamline.edu. 
1 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). 
2 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
3 No. 09-893 (U.S. argued Nov. 9, 2010). Docketed 09-893 (May 24, 2010). 
4 Eric J. Magnuson, The State of the Judiciary, 67 no. 7 Bench & BAR OF MINNESOTA 20, 
23 (Aug. 2010). 
5 California Officer of Legislative Analysis, The 2011-2012 Budget: California’s Fiscal 
Outlook (2010), available at 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2010/bud/fiscal_outlook/fiscal_outlook_2010.aspx#chap1. 
6 Illinois Lawmakers Propose 75 Percent Income Tax Hike, CBS Chicago, Jan. 6, 2011, 
http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2011/01/06/tax-increase-plan-bigger-than-expected/ (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2011).  
7 Brad Bumsed, Pennsylvania’s $4 billion deficit not as high as other states’, PITTSBURGH 
TRIBUNE-REVIEW, Jan. 8, 2011, available at 
http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/regional/s_717237.html. 
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projected deficit of $6.2 billion8 but subsequently discovered that the projected 
deficit is “only” $5 billion.9 
 So the desperate question that predictably will cause increased hand 
wringing is “what to do, what to do?” Given the dire circumstances, some are 
advocating across the board cuts in spending. On March 27, 2011 Minnesota 
Public Radio (MPR News) in cooperation with the Citizens League initiated an 
ongoing, online discussion that asks Minnesota residents to indicate whether they 
would support across the board spending cuts.10 Initiating the conversation, the 
MPR News online video cites a Wilder Foundation survey that reported that thirty 
percent of the Minnesota residents surveyed would support across the board cuts so 
long as the cuts were short term.11 
 Anyone who pays attention to the media knows that many state legislators 
are determined to implement substantial cuts in spending. The Republican Party 
now controls both Houses in the Minnesota legislature, for example. On Feb. 10, 
2011, new Democratic Gov. Mark Dayton vetoed a Republican-drafted budget 
proposal that cut $824 million from the next 2-year budget and also cut an 
additional $100 million from the current budget ending June 2011.12 
 In order to understand what cuts of this magnitude would mean for the 
court system one needs to know what it costs to operate the judicial branch.  In 
Minnesota, the judiciary’s budget is allocated in the following manner:  
 
                                                 
8 MINN. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ECONOMIC FORECAST (Nov. 2010), available at 
http://www.mmb.state.mn.us/doc/fu/10/summary-nov10.pdf; Memorandum from Steve 
Sviggum, Comm’r of Minn. Mgmt. & Budget to the Legislative Reference Library, Chief 
Clerk of the House of Representatives, and Sec’y of the Senate (Dec. 2, 2010), available at 
http://www.mmb.state.mn.us/doc/bonds/debt-cap/forecast-nov-10.pdf. 
9 MINN. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ECONOMIC FORECAST (Feb. 2011), available at 
http://www.mmb.state.mn.us/doc/fu/11/summary-feb11.pdf.  
10 MPR News, March 27, 2011 
http://minnesota.publicradio.org/collections/special/columns/statewide/archive/rundown/.  
11 Id. (found at 1:20 of the 1:42 video). Wilder Foundation report that thirty percent support 
across the board cuts. 
12 Mike Kaszuba, Fight Is On As Dayton Vetoes GOP Cuts, STARTRIBUNE, Feb. 11, 
2011, http://www.startribune.com/politics/local/115809399.html. 
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 District Courts- $247,384,000  
 Supreme Court/State Court Administration- $42,997,000  
 Court of Appeals- $10,178,000  
 Total - $300,559,00013 
 
Even before the specter of across the board cuts raised its unsettling head, jurists 
were sounding the alarm that judicial standards could not be maintained at current 
funding levels. After just 2 years on the bench, Minnesota Supreme Court Chief 
Justice Eric Magnuson left the bench in June 2010. Chief Justice Magnuson had 
complained frequently and publicly that the court system was underfunded and 
facing a crisis.  One month before resigning he declared he was "disappointed" that 
then Governor Tim Pawlenty proposed a cut to judicial budgets "at a time when 
our base budgets are already insufficient.”14  
 On June 24, 2010, in his last speech to the Minnesota State Bar 
Association in the role of Chief Justice, Magnuson explained that the Minnesota 
Judicial branch had over 250 staff vacancies and twenty-four fewer judges than 
needed.15 As a result, for many cases the time required to finally bring the case to 
trial had doubled.16 It was taking more than a year to bring one out of every four 
serious felonies to trial; conciliation court cases required six to eight months before 
there was a hearing; and public services, staff hours and wages were being cut.17  
 State budgets are in turmoil and legislators must make significant cuts. 
Underfunded court systems that already were carefully rationing resources will 
have to find additional ways to reduce expenditures, which probably will require a 
further reduction in services. As a result and as a simple, practical matter, the 
                                                 
13 Minnesota Judicial Branch, Fast Facts about the Judicial Branch, 
http://www.mncourts.gov/?page=432.  
14 Rachel E. Stassen-Berger, Magnuson Steps Down As State’s Chief Justice, 
STARTRIBUNE, 
Mar. 11, 2010, http://www.startribune.com/politics/87368147.html?source=error. 
15 Magnuson, supra note 4. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
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Judiciary needs healthy arbitral institutions and smoothly functioning arbitral 
processes. 
 Because justice delayed is justice denied, due process demands that 
disputes be addressed as quickly and efficiently as possible, a task that becomes 
more challenging for court systems with every budget cut. The goal is not merely 
aspirational. State constitutions impose critical obligations on state court systems.18 
 Arbitration currently is, and increasingly will be, valued (and protected) as 
a way to mitigate pressures on the judiciary. At the risk of sounding too cynical, 
the author believes that judges will hesitate to write opinions that limit the 
enforceability of arbitration clauses or limit arbitrators’ authority at the outset of a 
dispute. Judges will be strongly motivated to defer to arbitration when asked to 
stay arbitral proceedings because judges simply cannot afford to make an 
increasingly unmanageable situation even worse. 
 You may not be convinced, or not sufficiently cynical to believe, that 
financial exigencies will force judges to formulate and embrace a pro-arbitration 
jurisprudence that not only protects, but may exceed, the current deferential 
approach to arbitration. But budget challenges will require adaptations that will 
affirm, and perhaps strengthen, the role arbitration plays in the administration of 
justice, independent of the jurisprudential approaches that judges craft. As budgets 
continue to be cut, governors will be in no hurry to make judicial appointments and 
it is likely that judgeships may remain vacant for unprecedented amounts of time. 
And even though populations may increase, it may be difficult to persuade 
legislators to increase the number of judges accordingly. 
 As a result, courts may try (and may need) to integrate arbitration more 
formally and more closely into the judicial process. If there are not enough judges 
to handle all the demands on their time, then one solution would be to free judges 
                                                 
18 Id. (citing the words of former Minnesota Chief Justice Eric Magnuson, “[t]he first 
substantive provision of our constitution states the object of government is to provide for 
the ‘security, benefit and protection of the people.’ Government achieves this directive by 
making laws and enforcing them through its justice system. To fulfill this basic mandate, 
government must have a fully functioning justice system”). 
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from the more mundane of their responsibilities and allow them to concentrate on 
complex tasks. Rather than contemplating only the traditional option of essentially 
displacing the court system with arbitration, the time may have come for state 
court systems to consider increased reliance on arbitrators to handle discovery 
issues and preliminary motions. But even if this does not happen, arbitration will 
be protected and likely will increase. 
      
III. TECHNOLOGY FACILITATED ARBITRATION – BARTIES WILL 
EXPECT/DEMAND IT  
 
 The author has been writing and speaking about technology mediated 
dispute resolution (TMDR) for the past decade and is convinced that dispute 
resolution processes increasingly will rely on technology.19 TMDR includes Online 
Dispute Resolution (ODR), but adds cellular telephones, satellite communications, 
tele-immersion, video conferencing, avatars and virtual personalities, and artificial 
intelligence software and devices (including robots). Technology is advancing and 
being embraced at, well, warp speed.20 For instance, the average thirteen to 
seventeen year old teenager sends 3,339 text messages per month (more than 100 
per day) and billions of tweets are sent per month.21 
                                                 
19 See David Allen Larson, Artificial Intelligence: Robots, Avatars, and the Demise of the 
Human  
Mediator, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 105,105-07 (2010); David Allen Larson, 
Technology Mediated  
Dispute Resolution (TMDR): A New Paradigm for ADR, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
629, 633-34 (2006); David Allen Larson, Technology Mediated Dispute Resolution 
(TMDR): Opportunities and Dangers, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 213, 214 (2006); see generally, 
David Allen Larsen, Online Dispute Resolution: Do You Know Where Your Children Are?, 
19 Negotiation J. 199 (2003). 
20 “Warp speed” is a term developed in science fiction to describe the way that space-time 
warps can be used to allow faster-than-light travel, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, available 
at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/warp%20speed.   It is, to put it simply, 
extraordinarily fast. 
21Katherine Rosman, Y U Love Texts, H8 Calls, WALL ST. J.,(Oct. 14, 2010), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703673604575550201949192336.html?K
EYWORDS=y+u+love+texts.  
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We are in the midst of a Technology Revolution, the most significant 
cultural and social change since the industrial revolution. We are experiencing 
fundamental changes in the ways in which we communicate and interact through 
our reliance, and increasing dependence, on the Internet, digital technology and 
Web 2.0 (user created content). In our children we are witnessing a generation 
being raised on technology, learning to utilize technology intuitively (as digital 
natives) as opposed to the way that I, and probably you, understand technology (as 
digital immigrants). For many of us, traditional separations between work/personal 
time and physical/virtual reality are being eviscerated. 
Generation Y is just one of the many terms used to describe young adults 
who also have been labeled “The Boomerang Generation” because of their 
inclination to move back in with their parents after living independently.22 Also 
known as Millennials, these individuals are the children of post WWII Baby 
Boomers with birth dates ranging somewhere from the late 1970s to the early 
2000s.23 Millennials embrace multiple forms of expression, three quarters have a 
profile on a social networking site, one in five have posted a video of themselves 
online, and many Millenials say their use of social media is what distinguishes 
their generation.24 Text messaging is a preferred medium of communication (1.5 
trillion text messages were sent in 2009,25 which is two years ago and a veritable 
lifetime when it comes to technology) and one-third of online 18-29 year olds post 
or read status updates.26 
                                                 
22 Deborah Rothberg, Generation Y for Dummies, eWeek.com (August 24, 2006) available 
at  http://www.eweek.com/c/a/IT-Management/Generation-Y-for-Dummies/. 
23Millenials (millennial generation), 
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/millennials.html. 
24 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Millennials a Portrait of the Generation Next (2010), available 
at http://pewsocialtrends.org/assets/pdf/millennials-confident-connected-open-to-
change.pdf.  
25 CTIA, The Wireless Association Announces Semi-Annual Wireless Industry Survey 
Results (2010), available at http://www.ctia.org/media/press/body.cfm/prid/1936. 
26 Amanda Lenhart, et al., Social Media and Young Adults, PEWINTERNET, Feb. 3, 2010, 
available at http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Social-Media-and-Young-
Adults.aspx?r=1. 
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This generation soon will enter adulthood. They not only will expect, they 
will demand, that the problem solvers and dispute resolvers they employ will be 
comfortable and capable with the technologies that they use on a daily, and hourly, 
basis. Fortunately, arbitration is well suited to technology facilitated 
communications. And with its streamlined procedures and flexibility, it certainly is 
better suited to TMDR than litigation.   
Long time arbitrators, of course, have relied on technology for decades.  
Arbitrators have used the telephone and fax machine for many years, for instance, 
and have more recently added e-mail and perhaps video. “Document only” 
arbitrations have been available for decades and are essentially identical to the text 
based arbitrations that can take place online.27 And even if a digital immigrant 
feels that he or she cannot function effectively as an arbitrator or as an advocate 
without physical (as opposed to virtual) face-to-face interaction, digital natives will 
not feel the same constraints.  
Although it is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that as we 
increase our understanding of the power and potential of artificial intelligence, we 
will be able to integrate artificial intelligence into our arbitral processes in ways 
that will lower the cost of arbitration while at the same time improving outcomes.28 
As arbitration integrates technology into its processes, we need to be 
attentive to potential dangers and new issues. Will technology mediated arbitration 
be so similar to traditional arbitration that we can rely on the same rules, or do we 
need to draft new rules?  Should reviewability standards for technology facilitated 
arbitration, for example, be the same as the rules for traditional, off-line 
                                                 
27 The author has served as the arbitrator in more than sixty document only arbitrations and 
perceives   little difference between a document only arbitration and an arbitration that 
takes place online. In fact,   because physical documents do not need to be exchanged, the 
online arbitration likely will proceed much more quickly. And if the parties decide they 
want to interact face to face, that interaction can be arranged much more quickly and 
inexpensively by using video rather than by making travel arrangements to a common 
destination.  
28 See David Allen Larson, “Brother Can You Spare a Dime?” Technology Can Reduce 
Dispute Resolution Costs When Times Are Tough and Improve Outcomes, 11 Nev. L.J. 523 
(2011).  
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arbitration? More specifically, are we comfortable relying on the same limited 
scope of review that is available under the Federal Arbitration Act,29 for instance, 
or do we need new standards of review that take into account the dangers inherent 
in technology? Will hardware and software discrepancies among the parties, or 
power imbalances due to familiarity with technology, mean that the scope of 
judicial review will have to expand? We may need to expand the scope of our 
award review and focus not only on the arbitrator’s conduct, but the characteristics 
of the technology chosen and the way that technology is employed. 
Anyone who has seen teenagers texting each other when they are on the 
opposite side of the same room understands that Millennials are not only 
comfortable with, but may prefer, technology facilitated communication. They will 
guarantee that increasing levels of technology will be integrated into our dispute 
resolution processes. 
Arbitration can and will work with technology, but we must keep in mind 
that platform design matters. Technology Mediated Dispute Resolution will 
experience significant growth when TMDR service providers and neutrals follow 
rather than lead. When technology mediated arbitration platforms and formats are 
designed to track technology users’ day to day practices and patterns, then 
technology facilitated arbitration will expand exponentially and arbitration’s place 
in the world of dispute resolution processes will be enhanced. 
                                                 
29 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §10 (2009). stating that an arbitral award may be 
vacated: 
1. Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue 
means.   
2. Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the 
arbitrators, or either of them. 
3. Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to 
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in 
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the 
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights 
of any party have been prejudiced.   
4. Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly 
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon 
the subject matter submitted was not made.  
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IV. ARBITRATION IS UNDER ATTACK  
 
 This section is not intended to be an exhaustive presentation of all the 
attacks that have been directed at arbitration, but rather is intended to illustrate the 
types of challenges being leveled, and the actions being taken, to limit arbitration. 
Arbitration has experienced increasing criticism in recent years and it would be 
disingenuous, and in fact dishonest, to maintain that all of the criticism is 
unwarranted. Courts, legislatures, and commentators have been specific about the 
arbitral procedures and practices that they believe must be reformed.  
 The attacks, however, will not prove fatal. Facing charges of 
unenforceability and unconscionably, companies are beginning to revise their 
arbitration agreements in order to make those agreements much more consumer 
friendly and, thus, ensure enforceability.30 Combine this fact with the reality that 
court systems increasingly must rely on dispute resolution processes, along with 
the fact that arbitration is well-suited to technology facilitated communication, and 
the unavoidable conclusion is that arbitration will survive. 
 Much of the criticism regarding arbitration has been leveled at predispute 
mandatory arbitration provisions. Legislative efforts to limit predispute arbitration, 
for instance, include the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, 31 which provides a mandate for the new Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection to study and report to Congress regarding the use of mandatory 
predispute arbitration in consumer financial services.32 Based on its findings, the 
                                                 
30 See, e,g.,  The revised, more consumer friendly language in the arbitration agreement that 
is at issue in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 45 (U.S. 2010).  
31 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376-2223 (2010) (hereinafter ‘Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act’), 111th Cong. 
(2010). 
32 Id. § 1028 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5518) ((a) STUDY AND REPORT.—The Bureau 
shall conduct a study of, and shall provide a report to Congress concerning, the use of 
agreements providing for arbitration of any future dispute between covered persons and 
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Bureau has rulemaking authority to "prohibit or impose conditions or limitations 
on the use of" mandatory arbitration clauses.”33 This legislation also grants the 
Securities Exchange Commission substantial authority to regulate the use of 
arbitration to resolve securities disputes.34 Mandatory arbitration is prohibited for 
securities fraud35 and commodities fraud36 whistleblowers.  And mandatory 
arbitration cannot be required for mortgage and home equity loans.37 
 Broad limiting provisions of the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act,38 
which at the time of this article still has not been enacted (and which frankly 
appears to have lost some of its initial momentum)39 is a blatantly heated response 
to, and rejection of, predispute mandatory arbitration clauses. The presence of 
these clauses in consumer credit contracts, franchise agreements and employment 
contracts are the focus of this proposed legislation. The legislation asserts that “no 
predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires 
arbitration of (1) an employment, consumer, or franchise dispute; or (2) a dispute 
arising under any statute intended to protect civil rights.”40 The proposed 
legislation, which is short and to the point, declares in Section 2 that:  
 
                                                                                                                            
consumers in connection with the offering or providing of consumer financial products or 
services). 
33 Id.  ((b) FURTHER AUTHORITY.—The Bureau, by regulation, may prohibit or impose 
conditions or limitations on the use of an agreement between a covered person and a 
consumer for a consumer financial product or service providing for arbitration of any 
future dispute between the parties, if the Bureau finds that such a prohibition or imposition 
of conditions or limitations is in the public interest and for the protection of consumers. 
The findings in such rule shall be consistent with the study conducted under subsection 
(a)). 
34 Id. § 921 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o & § 80b-5). 
35 Id. § 922. 
36 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act § 748. 
37 Id. § 1414. 
38 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009) (hereinafter ‘Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2009’). 
39 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (the author suspects that any momentum that 
has been lost regarding the Arbitration Fairness Act may be recaptured after the Supreme 
Court issues its decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion).  
40 See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 § 4. 
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Mandatory arbitration undermines the development of public 
law for civil rights and consumer rights, because there is no 
meaningful judicial review of arbitrators' decisions. With the 
knowledge that their rulings will not be seriously examined 
by a court applying current law, arbitrators enjoy near 
complete freedom to ignore the law and even their own 
rules.41 
 
At the time of this article, it appears that the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act has 
stalled and will not be enacted any time soon.42  Predispute mandatory arbitration 
clauses continue to be challenged as unenforceable, however, based on state 
contract law.  Nonetheless, in the absence of sweeping prohibitive legislation, 
predispute arbitration agreements are not going to disappear.  Arbitration 
agreements will not be held per se unenforceable on state common law grounds 
when those agreements are revised to be much more consumer/employee friendly 
in terms of costs, venue, timeliness and damages. 
 As the voices criticizing arbitration appear to get stronger, or at least 
louder, we learned on Jan. 20, 2011, that a historically stalwart proponent of 
deferral to arbitration, the National Labor Relations Board, may be changing 
course.  Thus it may be appropriate to ask, “et tu NLRB?”  In a recent 
Memorandum the Board’s General Counsel announced that:  
 
[T]he Board’s current post-arbitral deferral policy is 
distinctly at odds with that which prevails in other areas of 
                                                 
41 See id. § 2 (one reasonably can assume that the drafters believe that arbitrators are 
ignoring the law and their own rules). 
42 Deficit reduction concerns appear to the primary, and sometimes even the sole, focus of 
the national and state legislatures to the exclusion of other issues. But see the final sentence 
of this article before the Conclusion section, suggesting that the Supreme Court’s 
forthcoming decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion may breathe new life into H.R. 
1020, the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, Rep. Johnson, Henry Hank (introduced Feb 12, 
2009), infra at pg. 36. 
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employment law. …[it is] the Board’s obligation to ensure 
the protection of employees’ statutory rights prior to 
exercising its discretion to defer to an arbitrator’s award, 
rather than providing an even lower standard of protection of 
statutory rights, as does the current deferral framework.”43 
(emphasis added) 
 
The General Counsel adds that: 
 
[T]he party urging deferral must demonstrate that: (1) the 
contract had the statutory right incorporated in it or the 
parties presented the statutory issue to the arbitrator; (2) and 
the arbitrator correctly enunciated the applicable statutory 
principles, and applied them in deciding the issue.44 
(emphasis added) 
 
The General Counsel concludes by stating that if the party urging deferral can 
satisfy this standard, then the Board should defer unless the award is “clearly 
repugnant.”45 An award is clearly repugnant if it reaches a result that is “palpably 
wrong.”46 Now required to explain a growing list of terms of art, the General 
Counsel adds that an arbitrator’s award is palpably wrong if it “is not susceptible 
to an interpretation consistent with the Act.”47 
                                                 
43 Acting General Counsel, Guideline Memorandum Concerning Deferral to Arbitral 
Awards and Grievance Settlements in Section 8(a)1 and (3) cases to All Regional 
Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers of National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) General Counsel Memorandum GC 11-05 (Jan 20, 2011) available at 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458043b761. 
44 Id. at 6-7.   
45 Id. at 7. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
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 Although labor arbitration is not subject to the Federal Arbitration Act, but 
instead falls under the jurisdiction of Section 301 of the Labor Management and 
Reporting Act of 1947,48 the General Counsel’s proposed change in enforcement 
policy is noteworthy. Anyone familiar with labor law is well acquainted with three 
Supreme Court cases decided in the 1960s commonly referred to as the 
Steelworkers Trilogy.49 Those three cases implicitly acknowledge that disputes 
arising out of collective bargaining agreements number in the thousands every year 
and that our justice system depends upon experienced labor arbitrators to resolve 
those disputes. Arbitral awards were declared enforceable so long as an award 
“draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.”50 The Court declared 
in United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp. that: 
 
[T]he question of interpretation of the collective bargaining 
agreement is a question for the arbitrator. It is the arbitrator's 
construction which was bargained for; and so far as the 
arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract, 
the courts have no business overruling him because their 
interpretation of the contract is different from his.51 
 
Back in the midst of the Great Depression when Congress was drafting the Wagner 
Act,52 the legislation that later became the National Labor Relations Act, Congress 
understood that if parties are allowed to control their own dispute resolution 
process it is more likely that parties will own, respect and honor the result of that 
process. In fact, the National Labor Relations Act states in no uncertain terms: 
                                                 
48 Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. Sections 141-197 (enacted Jun 
23, 1947). 
49 United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. 
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Ent. Wheel 
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
50 Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597. 
51 Id. at 599. 
52 49 Stat. 449 (1935). 




Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of 
employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards 
commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and 
promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain 
recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by 
encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly 
adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as 
to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by 
restoring equality of bargaining power between employers 
and employees.53 (emphasis added) 
 
If parties are going to be allowed to own their disputes, then by definition judicial 
review must be limited.  The parties will have to take responsibility for the process 
and results. The expectation is that parties will respect the arbitral awards 
generated by a dispute process they chose and designed and will not resort instead 
to actions that will lead to “industrial strife and unrest.” Once courts and 
administrative agencies expand their review and control of those awards, however, 
the sense that this result was “ours and we own it” begins to disappear.   
 The fact that the General Counsel is recommending that the National 
Relations Board expand its review of arbitral decisions suggests that the trust once 
accorded labor arbitrators is waning. The historically paramount goal of ensuring 
industrial peace by assuming a “hands off” approach to privately negotiated, 
collectively bargained, labor arbitration processes is being compromised by a new 
focus on both the conduct and competence of the arbitrators and the integrity of the 
arbitration process itself. But given the current climate the General Counsel may 
have concluded that it had little choice but to increase the degree of scrutiny 
                                                 
53 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2010). 
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arbitral awards receive, consistent with a general trend to increase scope of review 
on the “back end,” after the award has issued.   
 Finally, commentators have been battling back and forth regarding the 
merits of arbitration. Those familiar with the debate are well aware of the highly 
critical reports published by the nonprofit organization Public Citizen. Claiming 
“stunning” results that disadvantage consumers, biased decisionmakers, 
suspiciously secret proceedings, and a lack of due process protections,54 Public 
Citizen’s attacks on the use of predispute binding arbitration in the credit card 
industry have been instrumental in exposing questionable and unfair practices in 
that industry. Other commentators asserted, however, that many of Public Citizen’s 
claims were exaggerated and that a closer look reveals that consumers were not 
nearly as disadvantaged as Public Citizen claimed.55 Thus began an exchange 
among commentators challenging each other’s data and conclusions.56   
The Searle Civil Justice Institute Task Force on Consumer Arbitration then 
conducted a broad-based study of consumer arbitrations administered by the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA).57 Described as an empirically based 
study, the 139 page (as published) Searle Report suggests that consumers do not 
fare nearly as badly in AAA’s arbitrations as many have claimed.58 The Searle 
report concludes that much empirical work needs to be done, however, and that 
                                                 
54 Public Citizen, How the Credit Card Companies Ensnare Consumers, p. 2 (Sept. 2007), 
http://www.citizen.org/publications/publicationredirect.cfm?ID=7545.  
55 See Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration – A Good Deal for Consumers: A Response to Public 
Citizen, Chamber of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform (2008), 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/get_ilr_doc.php?docId=1091.   
56 Compare, e.g., Public Citizen, The Arbitration Debate Trap:  How Opponents of 
Corporate Accountability Distort the Debate on Arbitration (July 2008), 
http://www.citizen.org/publications/publicationredirect.cfm?ID=7589, with Sarah Rudolph 
Cole and Theodore H. Frank, The Current State of Consumer Arbitration, 15 Disp. Resol. 
Magazine 1 (Fall 2008). 
57 Consumer Arbitration Task Force Searle Civil Justice Institute, Consumer Arbitration 
Before the American Arbitration Association, Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and 
Economic Growth at Northwestern University School of Law (March 2009). 
58 Id. at 111–112. 
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any conclusions that can be drawn from its research are limited.59 Assuming the 
correctness of the Searle Institute’s assertion that additional empirical work is 
essential, one can conclude that while commentators’ articles may continue to 
inflame passions, those articles will not immediately determine the future of 
arbitration. 
 
V. SUPREME COURT CASES 
 
A. Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson 
 
 In Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson,60 the plaintiff Jackson filed an 
employment discrimination suit in Nevada federal court against his former 
employer Rent-A-Center. Four years before filing this lawsuit, Jackson had signed 
a “Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims” as a condition of employment.61 The 
“Claims Covered by Agreement” section provides for arbitration of all “past, 
present or future” disputes arising out of employment with Rent-A-Center.62 The 
“Arbitration Procedures” section adds that “the Arbitrator…shall have exclusive 
authority to resolve any dispute relating to the…enforceability…of this Agreement 
including, but not limited to, any claim that all or any part of this Agreement is 
void or voidable.”63 At first glance it might appear that this provision is 
unambiguous and straightforward. The issue in this case, however, was whether 
the second provision, identified as the “delegation provision,” is unenforceable 
because it is unconscionable.64 
 In an opinion that references many of the seminal Supreme Court 
decisions regarding arbitration, the Court first notes that because arbitration is “a 
                                                 
59 Id. at 113. 
60 Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). 
61 Id. at 2775. 
62 Id. at 2777. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
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matter of contract,” parties can agree to arbitrate “arbitrability” questions.65  
Agreements to arbitrate “gateway” issues (such as the question of whether an 
arbitration agreement covers a specific issue) are merely additional, enforceable, 
antecedent arbitration agreements.66 When parties clearly and unmistakably agree 
that arbitrators should decide whether parties have entered into a valid contract, 
courts should enforce that agreement.67 Thus in Rent-A-Center, the Court embraces 
the position that when the enforceability of an arbitration agreement is in issue, the 
consent of the parties is the key consideration and we must respect the freedom of 
contract principle. 
 So what is the result when this analytical approach is applied to the Rent-
A-Center facts? More precisely, who should decide whether the Rent-A-Center 
agreement was unconscionable, the arbitrator or a court? At present there a two 
possible kinds of arbitration agreement enforceability challenges: one specifically 
challenges the enforceability of the arbitration agreement and the other challenges 
the contract in its entirety.68 Because Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act states 
that an arbitration provision is enforceable without reference to the validity of the 
contract in which it is contained,69 a challenge to a contract in its entirety does not 
prevent enforcement of the specific agreement to arbitrate.70 
 The fact that the agreements to arbitrate are severable, however, does not 
mean they cannot be challenged. If a party specifically challenges the agreement to 
                                                 
65 Rent-A-Center W., 130 S. Ct. at 2777 (referencing Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 
Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003); First 
Options of Chi. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995)). 
66 Rent-A-Ctr, W., 130 S. Ct. at 2777-78. 
67 Id. at 2778 (citing First Options of Chi., 514 U.S. at 938; AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Commc’n 
Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643 (1986). 
68 Id. (citing Buckeye Check Cashing Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006)). 
69 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2008) (providing that “[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or 
a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a 
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform 
the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an 
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract”).                                                                                                                                               
70 Rent-A-Center, W., 130 S. Ct. at 2778. 
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arbitrate, then a federal court must consider that challenge.71 Because arbitration is 
a matter of consent, a court must first decide if parties agreed to arbitration. But if 
the challenge goes to the entire contract within which the arbitration agreement is 
contained, then the arbitrator resolves the issue. 
 The Court’s analysis to this point was not new and had been clearly 
articulated in earlier cases. So why was it necessary for the Court to address the 
issue in Rent-A-Center? The agreement to arbitrate employment disputes was the 
only contract in Rent-A-Center, the arbitration agreement was not the subsection of 
a larger contract. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had concluded that 
because the agreement to arbitrate was the only contract, then a challenge to that 
contract is a challenge to the arbitration provision itself.72 
 The United States Supreme Court was unwilling to accept this modestly 
expansive interpretation of its prior holdings. The Court insisted that its rule had to 
be applied strictly and literally. Only when a party challenges the “precise 
agreement to arbitrate,” must a court consider that challenge before ordering 
arbitration.73 The rule does not depend upon the type of contract in issue. The fact 
that the only contract in Rent-A-Center was actually an arbitration agreement 
makes no difference. An agreement to arbitrate enforceability disputes is severable 
from an overlying agreement to arbitrate discrimination disputes and the agreement 
to arbitrate enforceability disputes must be challenged individually and 
specifically. 
 Jackson asserted that because the entire contract was unconscionable, the 
provision delegating decisional power to the arbitrator was meaningless. But 
because Jackson argued the entire contract was unconscionable, the arbitrator 
decides the issue. Justice Stevens’s dissent, which was joined by three other 
Justices74 and which criticizes the majority opinion on several different points, 
                                                 
71 Id. 
72 Jackson v. Rent-A-Ctr W., Inc., 581 F.3d 912. 918-919 (2009). 
73 Rent-A-Center, W., 130 S. Ct. at 2778. 
74 Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor.  
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echoes the words of the Ninth Circuit in one important respect. According to 
Stevens, the subject matter of this contract was exclusively arbitration and any 
challenge to the contract itself is necessarily a challenge to the arbitration 
agreement.75  In other words, “[t]hey are one and the same.”76  
 
 1. Rent-A-Center – Deference on the Front End 
 
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel 
77 subsequently has led to inconsistent interpretations in the United States Court of 
Appeals,78 at least initially it appeared the Court had established a clear rule that 
Federal Arbitration Act "§§10 and 11 respectively provide the FAA’s exclusive 
grounds for expedited vacatur and modification.”79 
If judicial review is severely limited, then the issue of which questions the 
arbitrator decides becomes critical. There will not be a second look. Rent-A-Center 
champions freedom of contract when it confirms that parties can direct arbitrability 
questions to the arbitrator and away from the judicial system. The Court 
announced what appears to be a literal test.  Challenge the enforceability of a 
contract that contains an arbitration delegation clause, and the arbitrator will 
resolve that question. Challenge the enforceability of the delegation provision itself 
and the court decides. 
But if the goal is to protect freedom of contract, one has to ask – in Rent-A-
Center was the Court protecting a contract that truly was freely negotiated?  
Should we “bend over backwards” and meticulously distinguish, separate and 
protect delegation provisions in all contracts, even adhesion contracts? Did 
Jackson actually intend to reserve this question for the arbitrator? And do we want 
as many cases as possible to go to arbitration? 
                                                 
75 Rent-A-Center, W., 130 S. Ct. at 2786-2787 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
76 Id. at 2787 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
77 Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
78 A split of authority has developed in the United States Courts of Appeal. 
79 Hall Street Assocs., 552 U.S. at 577. 
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A strong argument can be made that the Supreme Court’s arbitration 
jurisprudence is becoming less principled and more result oriented. The Supreme 
Court wants cases to be decided by arbitrators. At the beginning of a dispute, when 
determining who makes initial decisions, the Court appears determined to give 
arbitrators substantial authority. It is not unreasonable to suggest that in “budget 
challenged” times the Court has little choice. Appellate and trial court judges alike 
are going to be very deferential towards arbitration on the front end; that being, 
when determining whether judges or arbitrators get the first bite at the apple.   
The question then becomes what happens when an arbitral award is issued?  
Will the Court be as deferential when it comes to judicial review?  
 
B. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp 
 
 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp80 (Stolt-Nielsen) 
arose out of a situation in which AnimalFeeds International Corp. was shipping 
goods using a standard contract (commonly called a Charter Party) that included an 
arbitration clause.81 The clause contained the following language: 
 
Arbitration. Any dispute arising from the making, 
performance or termination of this Charter Party shall be 
settled in New York, Owner and Charterer each appointing 
an arbitrator, who shall be a merchant, broker or individual 
experienced in the shipping business; the two thus chosen, if 
they cannot agree, shall nominate a third arbitrator who shall 
be an Admiralty lawyer. Such arbitration shall be conducted 
in conformity with the provisions and procedure of the 
United States Arbitration Act [i.e., the FAA], and a judgment 
                                                 
80 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.,130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
81 Id. at 1764-65. 
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of the Court shall be entered upon any award made by said 
arbitrator.82 
 
A Department of Justice investigation revealed an illegal price-fixing conspiracy 
that led to a class action lawsuit and the parties agreed they must arbitrate.83 The 
parties then agreed to let arbitrators decide whether the arbitration agreement 
permits class arbitration, stipulating that the agreement was “silent” with regard to 
class arbitration.84 
 The parties agreed to submit the class arbitration question to three 
arbitrators who were to “follow and be bound by Rules 3 through 7 of the 
American Arbitration Association’s Supplementary Rules for Class 
Arbitrations.”85 Rule 3 directs the arbitrators to decide whether the arbitration 
clause permits class arbitration.86 Based on a) post Green Tree Financial Corp. v. 
Bazzle87 arbitral awards permitting class arbitration (but not mentioning whether 
those awards were based on the Federal Arbitration Act, New York law, or 
maritime law) and b) the lack of evidence of an intent to preclude class arbitration, 
the panel allowed class arbitration.88 
 When Stolt-Nielsen filed an application in district court to vacate the 
award, the district court determined that the arbitrators acted in “manifest disregard 
of the law” and vacated the award.89 The court explained that the arbitrators should 
have used choice of law analysis and applied federal maritime law requiring that 
contracts be interpreted according to custom and usage.90 
                                                 
82 Id. at 1765. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 1766. 
85 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1765 (internal quotations omitted). 
86 Id.  
87 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).  
88 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1766. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
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 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit first agreed 
with the district court that the doctrine of manifest disregard of the law survived 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.91 The 
Second Circuit reversed the district court, however, and held that because no 
authority applying a maritime rule or New York law against class arbitration was 
cited, the arbitrators had not manifestly disregarded the law.92 There was nothing 
in New York case law that prohibited class arbitration.93 
 The United States Supreme Court was not persuaded by the Second 
Circuit. The Court declared that the arbitrators’ award must be vacated because the 
arbitrators had exceeded their authority and imposed their own policy choice 
instead of ruling based on the Federal Arbitration Act, maritime law, or New York 
law.94 
 The Court explained that when an arbitration clause is “silent,” the 
arbitration panel must identify the governing rule of law and should assume that 
the parties intend default rules to control.95 An arbitration panel cannot ignore the 
fact that class arbitration is significantly different than bilateral arbitration when 
one considers cost, speed, and privacy.96 And even though the same limited rules 
of judicial review apply to class arbitration that apply to bilateral arbitration, the 
stakes are as high as they are in class action litigation.97 Therefore, because 
arbitration is a matter of consent, class arbitration simply cannot be imposed when 
the parties stipulate, as they did in this case, that they have not reached an 
agreement on this issue.98 
 The dissent maintains that the majority acted much too aggressively and 
engaged in an improper de novo review of an award issued by experienced 
                                                 
91 Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2777.  
92 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1758, 1766. 
93 Id. at 1766-67. 
94 Id. at 1768-69. 
95 Id. at 1770. 
96 Id. at 1776. 
97 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1776. 
98 Id. 
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arbitrators that had been selected by the parties.99 According to the dissent, the 
panel decided only that the arbitration clause used in the parties’ shipping contracts 
permits class arbitration.100 The award was abstract, highly interlocutory, and did 
not decide if AnimalFeed’s claims were appropriate for class action.101 Nor did the 
arbitrators identify any class or determine whether potential class members should 
be required to opt-in to the proceedings.102 This was a preliminary award, 
emphasized the dissent, and judicial review cannot be expanded by labeling it 
“Partial Final Award.” 103 In fact, allowing piecemeal review of this nature will 
have the undesirable result of making arbitration more like litigation.104 Judicial 
intervention by the majority at this juncture, asserted the dissent, was premature 
and violates the firm final-judgment rule of the federal court system.105 
 The dissent appears to believe strongly that the parties did agree to be 
bound by the arbitrators’ award and that, contrary to its explanation and analysis, 
the majority is rejecting the principle that arbitration is a matter of consent. 
 The dissent argued that the arbitrators’ award was the determination to 
which the parties agreed, that the award was within the submission, that the award 
was an honest decision, and that there had been a full and fair hearing.106 Federal 
Arbitration Act Section 10(a)(4) asks if arbitrators had the power to decide a 
particular issue.107 The dissent was convinced that the parties’ supplemental 
agreement referring the class arbitration question to the arbitrators unquestionably 
                                                 
99 Id. at 1777 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
100 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
101 Id. at 1778 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
102 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1778 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
103 Id. at 1779 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
104 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Metallgesellschaft A.G. v. M/V Capitan 
Constante, 790 F.2d 280, 283-285. (2nd Cir. 1986) (Feinberg, J., dissenting)). 
105 Id. at 1779 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
106 See id. at 1780 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (reciting grounds for vacatur as articulated in 
Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349, 17 How. 344, 349, 15 L.Ed. 96 (1855), subsequently 
codified in 9 U.S.C.  § 10(a), and concluding that vacatur was not appropriate in Stolt-
Nielsen). 
107 See supra note 29 for the text of The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10.  
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gave the arbitrators the power to decide whether class arbitrations are permitted.108 
Additionally, the panel was convinced that the arbitration panel did not ignore the 
relevant law.  In fact, according to the dissent, the arbitrators clearly explained that 
their decision to focus on the wording of the arbitration agreement as a basis for 
deciding whether the parties intended to permit class action was consistent with 
New York and maritime law.109 
 Stolt-Nielsen was a five to three decision in which Justice Sotomayer did 
not participate. Although the Supreme Court acknowledges that arbitrators have 
the authority to adopt procedures necessary to implement parties’ agreements, 
authorizing class actions without an expression of consent is not a mere procedural 
decision.110 In simple terms, class actions change the agreement. 
 The majority and dissenting justices analyze the question of whether the 
arbitral panel acted appropriately quite differently. The dissent believes that the 
arbitrators did not ignore the relevant law and, in fact, expressly explained that 
they acted based on their interpretation of New York law as articulated by the New 
York Court of Appeals.111 According to their interpretation of the law, the 
arbitrators believed that they should concentrate on the language of the arbitration 
clause.112 
 Revealing a significantly different interpretation of the facts, the majority 
asserts that the arbitrators ignored the relevant law and that the arbitrators acted 
based upon their own version of sound policy.113 And perhaps more importantly in 
the long term, the majority thought it was necessary to intervene and vacate an 
arbitral award in spite of the dissent’s argument that such intervention was 
premature and, in fact, interfered with the decision process the parties had chosen. 
                                                 
108 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1780 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
109 Id. at 1781 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
110 Id. at 1776. 
111 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
112 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
113Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1768-69. 
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 The Stolt-Nielsen majority’s reference to Hall Street Associates v. Mattel 
also is noteworthy. Although it was possible, and perhaps reasonable, to conclude 
after Hall Street courts no longer could cite manifest disregard of the law as a basis 
for vacating an arbitral award, in Stolt-Nielsen the Court announces that “[w]e do 
not decide whether ‘manifest disregard’ survives … Hall Street Associates … as an 
independent ground for review or as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for 
vacatur set for at 9 U.S.C. § 10.”114 The Court recites AnimalFeeds’ 
characterization of the standard as requiring proof that the arbitrators “knew of the 
relevant [legal] principle, appreciated that this principle controlled the outcome of 
the disputed issue, and nonetheless willfully flouted the governing law by refusing 
to apply it.”115 Assuming for the purposes of argument that the standard applied, 
the Court found that the arbitrators had manifestly disregarded the law in this 
case.116 
 
 1. Stolt-Nielsen – Deference on the Back End 
 
 During the earlier discussion of Rent-A-Center, the author suggested that 
on the front end; that being, before the arbitration begins, courts will be very 
deferential to arbitration. But Stolt-Nielsen suggests that on the back end, after 
arbitration has ended and an award has issued, courts will be much more willing to 
intervene. And the suggestion that manifest disregard of the law may still be 
available in spite of Hall Street indicates that the Court wants to ensure a fairly 
robust power of review. The Court, frankly, may not like all of the arbitral awards 
generated by its liberal deferral policy at the initiation of arbitration and may want 
to ensure that it has the power to vacate or reform awards that do not provide the 
results that the Court would prefer. The dissent in Stolt-Nielsen argues that the 
Court acted improperly and interfered with the dispute resolution process that the 
                                                 
114 Id. at 1768. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
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parties had chosen. An important question is whether Stolt-Nielsen will have a 
dramatic impact or whether its application will be limited.  While explaining that 
the arbitrators simply had imposed their own version of sound policy, the Court 
stated that the arbitrators should not have ignored industry custom and usage 
because those practices can reveal intent behind silence.117 In Stolt-Nielsen there 
was evidence that a) sophisticated business parties b) in this particular industry 
always avoid class arbitration.118 These facts should limit Stolt-Nielsen in future 
cases. Silence should be interpreted differently when the parties either are not 
similarly sophisticated or the evidence on custom and usage is not as one-sided. 
 If one suspects that the Court to is attempting to preserve, or even expand, 
the ability to review arbitration awards with which the Court disagrees, then in 
order to confirm or dispel that suspicion one has to consider the Court’s possible 
motivations. Why should one suspect that the Court is comfortable giving 
arbitrators the first opportunity to resolve the dispute only so long as it gets to take 
a second look? 
 It might be, as the NLRB General Counsel explains in its recommended 
change in arbitral deferral policy, that the Court wants to ensure that statutory 
rights, especially civil rights, are protected. But recall that the Supreme Court 
interpreted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964119 so narrowly that Congress 
had to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1991.120 Although the membership of the 
Supreme Court has changed since 1989, the time of the Supreme Court decisions121 
                                                 
117 Id. at 1769. 
118 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1769. 
119 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e17. 
120 P.L. 102 – 166, 105 Stat. 1071. 
121 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (current employees alleging 
unlawful racial harassment cannot recover under 42 U.S.C.  § 1981 because harassment is 
not included in the protection provided for “making and enforcing contracts”); Wards Cove 
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (employers’ burden to prove business 
necessity in a disparate impact discrimination lawsuit identified as merely a burden of 
production (although prior cases had described the burden as one of persuasion)); Lorance 
v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (the time limit for claiming unlawful 
discrimination based on a facially neutral seniority system begins to run at the time the 
seniority system is first adopted, not when the plaintiffs later are demoted as result of that 
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that prompted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the author does not believe that most 
commentators would argue that the Supreme Court has become more concerned 
with protecting individual civil rights. In fact, more recently the Court so 
thoroughly eviscerated the Americans with Disabilities Act122 that Congress 
concluded that it needed to enact the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments 
Act123 to restore the intent and promise of the original Americans with Disabilities 
Act. 
 One might suggest that the Court believes arbitrators are inclined, although 
not guaranteed, to make pro-business decisions. This suggestion, of course, 
justifies an entirely separate article. But it is not reckless to suggest that arbitrators, 
who tend to be successful professionals and business people, and who may be 
subject to the controversial “repeat player” phenomenon,124 might be predisposed 
(perhaps subconsciously if not consciously) to favor business interests. So the 
Court is comfortable construing arbitration clauses broadly to give arbitrators the 
first opportunity. But if the arbitrator strays, the Court wants to be able to adjust 
the arbitrators’ awards.  
 
C. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion  
 
 Although we do not yet have a decision, it makes sense in the context of 
this article to make a few observations regarding a case pending before the United 
                                                                                                                            
system); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (if an employee proves that 
membership in a protected class was a motivating factor for an adverse employment action, 
then the employer can avoid all liability by proving it would have made the same decision 
even though discrimination was a motivating factor); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) 
(although white fire fighters did not intervene when consent decrees were being entered in 
earlier employment discrimination proceedings, the firefighters still could challenge 
employment decisions taken pursuant to those decrees).  
122 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. 
123 P.L. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553. 
124 See Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 
EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL 189 (1997) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1324411. 
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States Supreme Court, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion.125 Although it is risky, 
perhaps even foolish, to predict the outcome in Supreme Court cases, recent 
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding arbitration may provide helpful insights.   
The case involves a consumer class action alleging AT&T advertised a 
second phone for free but then fraudulently charged tax on the “free phone.”126 The 
service contract that consumers signed stated that, “CINGULAR and you agree 
that no Arbitrator has the authority to (1) award relief in excess of what this 
agreement provides; (2) award punitive damages or any other damages not 
measured by the prevailing party's actual damages; or (3) order consolidation or 
class arbitration.” 127 Nevertheless, a lawsuit was filed and subsequently AT&T 
revised the arbitration agreement with additional language favoring consumers.128 
 The revised agreement states that if a customer prevails in arbitration and 
receives more than AT&T’s final offer, AT&T will pay $7500.00 plus double 
attorney fees.129 Consumers have the right to pursue punitive damages; a 
convenient venue; in-person, telephone or desk arbitration; and a waiver of 
AT&T’s right to recover attorneys’ fees and costs.130  
 The District Court found the agreement unconscionable,131 the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed,132 and Ninth Circuit added that the Federal Arbitration Act does 
not preempt California unconscionability law.133 The question pending before the 
Supreme Court asks “[w]hether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts States from 
conditioning the enforcement of an arbitration agreement on the availability of 
particular procedures - here, class-wide arbitration - when those procedures are not 
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necessary to ensure that the parties to the arbitration agreement are able to 
vindicate their claims.” 134 
 AT&T is arguing that California courts apply unconscionability doctrine 
more strictly when they review arbitral class action prohibitions.135 The Ninth 
Circuit had found the $7500.00 dollar promise did not save the agreement and was, 
in fact, irrelevant because, to avoid that cost, AT&T’s final offer will be the face 
amount of the claim.136 The specific question in this case thus becomes, when 
determining unconscionability, should a court consider effects on individuals other 
than the named plaintiffs and should the goal of deterrence be considered?  
 The case raises freedom of contract issues that have been determinative in 
recent cases and it has significant implications for consumers and employees (for 
example, regarding wage and hour claims). Large classes consisting of individuals 
who each possess small dollar amount claims arguably do not have an effective 
remedy available unless arbitration class actions are available. So what will happen 
in AT&T Mobility? 
 The Supreme Court has declared that parties may draft arbitration 
agreements that define the rules under which the arbitration will proceed.137 And 
the Court appears to be adopting a deferential approach to arbitration at the 
initiation stage. But the Court believes class arbitration should be treated 
differently because it is distinguishable from bilateral arbitration in terms of speed, 
cost, privacy and damages. Emphasizing these differences, the Court in Stolt-
Nielsen held that class arbitration cannot be compelled unless the parties expressly 
consent.  
A very likely outcome in AT&T Mobility is that the Court will enforce the 
contract as written, class arbitration will not be allowed, and AT&T will win this 
case. When the Court refuses to allow class arbitration it can be argued that the 
                                                 
134 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 2010 WL 302265.   
135 Brief for Petitioner, 2010 WL 3017755 at *30-31. 
136 AT&T Mobility, 584 F 3d. at 855-56. 
137 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. 489 U.S. 468, 479 
(1989). 
ARBITRATION UNDER ATTACK 
 
123 
Court is not nearly as deferential to arbitration on the “front end” as the author 
maintains. If what the author suggests is true, then one would think that the Court 
would be more than happy to let arbitrators assume the burden of managing class 
actions.  
The AT&T Mobility decision can be reconciled with the author’s 
assertions, however. Although the Court will not permit (defer to) class arbitrations 
in this instance, the Court will defer to the parties’ choice as expressly articulated 
in their arbitration agreement. Although the specific result in AT&T Mobility will 
be that one type of arbitration (class action) will not be allowed, this decision will 
be consistent with the freedom of contract and FAA preemption principles that 
ordinarily lead the court to defer to arbitration at the initial stages of a dispute. The 
Court will be acting consistently because it will defer to the arbitration agreement 
on the front end.138  
But this case will not change the fact that after an arbitration award has 
issued, the Court is not giving freedom of contract principles the same weight 
when it comes to the question of whether the Court should leave an arbitral award 
undisturbed. After an award has issued the Court appears to be less concerned with 
protecting the agreement to which the parties consented and more concerned with 
ensuring that the result is one with which the Court agrees. If the case is decided as 
the author anticipates, this decision will give new life to the currently stalled 
Arbitration Fairness Act. 
  
VI. CONCLUSION  
 
  Arbitration is under attack, but it will survive. To meet their obligation to 
deliver justice in a timely manner, budget stressed judicial systems that no longer 
can process cases in a prompt and effective manner have no choice. They must 
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create rules and issue judicial opinions that will ensure arbitration remains a viable 
alternative. And as our society becomes more technology dependent, arbitration is 
positioned to thrive because technology facilitated communication mediums can be 
integrated easily and seamlessly into arbitration processes. Although recently 
enacted and pending legislation limits, and even prohibits, arbitration in certain 
circumstances, the arbitration agreements that generated this legislative response 
are being revised and the momentum for additional legislative change appears to 
be dissipating, at least for the moment.   
But it is becoming increasingly difficult to anticipate what the boundaries 
and limits of arbitration will be in the future. Rent-A-Center v. Jackson indicates 
that courts, citing freedom of contract, will be very deferential to arbitration at the 
initiation stage, or the “front end.” But Stolt Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
International Corporation suggests that courts will be much less deferential when 
it comes to reviewing and vacating arbitral awards, “the back end.” Courts will be 
less deferential even though the same freedom of contract principle relied on in 
Rent-A-Center supports the argument that the courts should leave the award, the 
result of the process the parties chose, alone. 
The idea that the Supreme Court is developing an increasingly result-
oriented approach to arbitral award reviewability may be quite cynical. But a Court 
that is very willing to give arbitrators great leeway to resolve disputes in the first 
instance may have second thoughts about losing control. The Court may want to 
guarantee that the final result is one with which it is comfortable. If courts are 
going to rule in ways that ensure the viability of arbitration because of the 
judiciary’s financial problems, and if the Supreme Court is going to construct an 
award reviewability approach designed to guarantee that it will get a second look 
at a dispute that was first deferred to arbitration, then it will be increasingly 
difficult to articulate a principled theory that explains the scope and intent of 
judicial review. 
